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INTRODUCTION

During the past ten years much attention has been focused upon preserving our nation's dwindling supply of natural resources. While the average American citizen associates oil, water, and air with the term "natural resources," this nation's most precious resource, its children, remains
overlooked. The goal of conservation, to leave succeeding generations resources with which to build a greater future, becomes an exericse in futility when we fail to develop the potential of those succeeding generations.
This failure is evidenced by the unprecedented increase in crime among
persons under the age of twenty-one. 1 Forty-three percent of all police
arrests in 1974 involved persons under twenty-one years of age.? Further1. The F.B.I. reported that in 1974 the national crime rate, a reflection of the chances
of becoming a victim of major crime, had risen 32 percent since 1969 and 157 percent since

1960.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED

STATES 10, 11 (1974). See generally Reaves, The Right To Treatment For Juvenile Offenders, 7 CUM. L. REV. 13, 13-14 (1976).
2. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED

STATES 10, 45 (1974). See generally S. WINSLOW, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN A FREE SOCIETY
2-3 (1968); Pyfer, The Juveniles Right To Receive Treatment, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 279, 280-81
(1972); Reaves, The Right To Treatment For Juvenile Offenders, 7 CUM. L. REV. 13, 13-14
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more, the FBI has established that one third of all arrests for violent4
crimes in suburban areas involve persons under twenty-one years of age.
Recent studies indicate that Texas is not immune to this staggering juvenile crime rate.5
Although American courts, since 1899, have segregated youthful offenders from adult judicial and penal systems, 6 recent statistics indicate that
rehabilitation has not resulted from these efforts.' The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (F.B.I.) found that nearly seventy-five percent of offenders
under twenty years of age released from custody in 1965 were re-arrested
within five years.' As a result, some critics suggest the approach taken
toward juveniles is too lenient and, therefore, advocate harsher punishment of juvenile offenders.' At the opposite end of the spectrum, others
suggest the parens patriae'" promise of non-penal treatment is merely a

(1976).
3. See

FEDERAL BUREAU

OF INVESTIGATION,

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS,

CRIME IN THE

UNITED STATES 204 (1975). Murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault constitute violent

crime. Id. at 204.
4. Id. at 204.
5. See LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 300-08 (1973). The Sourcebook lists the number of children's cases disposed
of in juvenile court by state and county. A total of 15,713 cases were disposed of in Harris
County, Texas. That is three times the number disposed of in St. Louis, Missouri and twice

that of San Francisco, California. Id. at 302-06. See also FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 209 (1977). The Uniform Crime Report lists the 30 Metropolitan areas which appear most frequently among the top 30 cities in
per capita reported crime rates. Of the top 30 cities suffering from violent crime, 6 are in
Texas. Well over half of these crimes involve juvenile offenders. Id. at 209.
6. Prior to 1899 there was no legal distinction made between juveniles and adults. In
that year the Illinois legislature created the first juvenile court. This court employed a parental and therapeutic approach designed to eliminate behavioral traits that brought the

juvenile into the system. See generally R.

PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW

837-42 (2d

ed. 1969); Mennel, Origins of the Juvenile Court, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 68, 70-77 (1972).
7. Seventy one percent of those persons arrested who were between the ages of 20 and
24 years and 65 percent of those ages 20 to 29 were rearrested within five years of their
initial contact with police. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 33 (1977).
8. Id. at 34.
9. See Wigmore, Juvenile Court vs. Criminal Court, 21 ILL. L. REV. 375, 375-77 (1926).
The author contests the very existence of the juvenile court by questioning the premises
underlying such a system of justice and recommending imprisonment for juvenile offenders.
Id. at 375-77.
10. Parens patriae originated with the feudal chancery court. The term is literally
translated as "parent of the country." See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d
1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971). The doctrine was invoked to enable the state to protect the property rights of impoverished minors. Upon acceptance in the United States, the jursidiction
of the parens patriae ideal was intended to apply first to personal injuries and later to
children accused of criminal violations. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
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change of labels from the adult criminal process." Justice Fortas aptly
described the juvenile's plight in Kent v. United States,'2 by noting that
juveniles were denied procedural safeguards with the promise of treatment, yet never received that promised treatment.' 8 Due to such criticism
the courts began to reevaluate the juvenile justice system."1 The changes
resulting from this reevaluation, however, apply to the adjudicative stage
of juvenile proceedings and do not advance the goal of post-adjudicative
rehabilitation." In recent years a solution to the perplexing problem of
post-adjudicative rehabilitation has emerged in the "right to treatment"
concept. " Simply stated, the "right to treatment" guarantees the juvenile
post-adjudicative care and treatment aimed at rehabilitation." This concept found its origin in the mental health field in the late 1950's" and by
the middle of the next decade was applied to the post-adjudicative stage
of the juvenile process."
This comment will discuss the development of the right to treatment
concept and its applicability to the juvenile justice system. Consideration
will be given to the judicial recognition of the juvenile's right to treatment and the counterproductive lack of legislative response to this development. Recommendations will be made for incorporating the "right to
treatment" into Texas' juvenile justice statutes as a tool to fulfill the
promise of rehabilitation.

11. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (Burger, J., dissenting); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 78-81 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See generally A. ALEXANDER, Constitu-

tional Rights in the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR

THE CHILD

82, 92 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).

12. 383 U.S. 541 (1966)..
13. Id. at 555-56.
14. Reevaluation began with Kent and continued with later Supreme Court decisions.
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 531-34 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
365-68 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-27 (1967).
15. While Gault, Kent, and Winship adopted certain procedural safeguards applicable
to juveniles, the Supreme Court stopped short of adopting a constitutional right to treatment. Cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring) (Court
rejected opportunity to rule on right to treatment as applied to mentally ill). Chief Justice
Berger's concurring opinion reflected the Court's reluctance to recognize a right to treatment. The Court declined, however, to review Burnham v.Georgia, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975), a Fifth Circuit case which reaffirmed the holding
that a right to treatment does exist. Id. at 1321.
16. See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 502 (1960); Burris, The
Right to Treatment, 57 Geo. L.J. 673, 673-75 (1969).
17. See Reaves, The Right to Treatment for Juvenile Offenders, 7 CuM. L. REV. 13, 1617 (1976); Comment, Establishment of a ConstitutionalRight to Treatment for Delinquent
Children, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 366, 368-69 (1974). See generally Birnbaum, The Right to
Treatment 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 499 (1960).
18. See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 499 (1960).
19. See Kittrie, The Juvenile Process, 57 GEo. L.J. 848, 871-75 (1969).
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II.

RIGHT TO TREATMENT

The mental health field provided the impetus which brought the "right
to treatment" into national focus.2 0 Morton Birnbaum first advocated the
concept in 1960.1' Birnbaum argued that an individual institutionalized
under the parens patriaephilosophy must receive "adequate medical and
psychological treatment.""2 Believing the inherent problems in the system
could be remedied through the creation of new and more advanced treatment facilities,2 s Birnbaum asserted that judicial recognition of a right to
24
treatment would force legislatures to provide appropriate facilities.
Judicial recognition of a right to treatment can have either a statutory
or a constitutional basis.2 The first case to consider the right to treatment did so from a statutory basis.26 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that commitment of a sexual psychopath in an
institution for the violently insane, without treatment, violated a statute
specifically providing for treatment of offenders.2 Subsequent decisions
have required the existence of special treatment facilities, which must

20. See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 499-505 (1960); Editorial,
A New Right, 46 A.B.A.J. 516, 516-17 (1960).
21. See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 500-01 (1960).
22. Id. at 504.
23. Id. at 501.
24. See id. at 505. Birnbaum's efforts have been met with limited success. One need
consider that currently only five states have recognized a statutory right to treatment. See
IDAHO CODE § 66-344 (1980) (every patient shall be entitled to humane care and treatment);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-13 (Supp. 1975) (every patient is entitled to humane care and treatment to the extent facilities and personnel are available); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 91
(West 1979) (all patients at institutions shall be given humane care and treatment); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5547-5570 (Vernon 1958) (adequate medical and psychiatric care
and treatment shall be given each patient in accordance with the-highest standards accepted
in medical practice); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-46 (Supp. 1979) (every patient entitled to humane care and treatment). Four other states as well as the District of Columbia have given
tacit recognition to a right to treatment. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7251 (Deering
1979) (hospitalized individual is entitled to care); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (West 1967)
(hospitalized patient is entitled to treatment); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 100-7 (SmithHurd 1980-1981) (those committed to state hospitals are entitled to highest quality care and
treatment); IOWA CODE ANN. § 225.15 (West Supp. 1980-1981) (patient is entitled to examination and appropriate treatment); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-2 (1970) (patient is entitled to
examination).
25. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 59-61 (1977). This volume contains the
working papers of the National Task Force to Develop Standards and Goals for Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention. It contains an excellent analysis of case law pertaining
to the right to treatment. See id. at 56.
26. See Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
27. Id. at 420. See generally Note, Persons In Need Of Supervision: Is There A Constitutional Right To Treatment?, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 624, 645 (1973).
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have been provided for by statute, before one could be confined under the
provisions of that statute.2 8 Eventually, the judiciaries' attention shifted
from the need for centers of treatment, to the availability of treatment
within those centers.2 9 While upholding the constitutionality of a Maryland statute allowing confinement of delinquent juveniles suffering from
mental health problems,"0 the district court in Sas v. Maryland,3 1 held
that if treatment was not provided there would be no justification for
32
confinement and the statute would be subject to constitutional attack.
In the absence of a statutory right to treatment, the institutionalized
individual was forced to find implied support for the "right to treatment"
in the constitution." Such constitutional support was first announced in
Rouse v. Cameron." Notwithstanding the fact the court's opinion was
based on a statute, 5 the decision concluded that anyone confined to a
mental institution has a constitutional right to treatment founded in the
fifth amendment.3 " Further, the Rouse court incorporated the eighth
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 7 by not28. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (based on statute,
court held a right to treatment existed which would be enforced); Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d
506, 516 (4th Cir. 1964) (court expressly rejected appellant's constitutional challenge of Maryland statute); Commonwealth v. Page, 159 N.E.2d 82, 85 (Mass. 1959) (finding non-penal
commitment valid under certain circumstances, but remedial aspects of commitment had to
be existent; not proper to confine appellant for treatment when treatment facilities were
non-existent).
29. This shift was first noted in Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1964).
The court required that the proposed objectives of the statute had to be implemented sufficiently to justify elimination of certain procedural safeguards. Id. at 516-17.
30. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 31B, §§ 645A, 688 (Supp. 1964).
31. 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
32. Id. at 516-17.
33. As previously mentioned, the only bases recognized by the courts for the right to
treatment have been statutory or constitutional. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELIQUENCY PREVENTION, STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 59-61
(1977).
34. 373 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (appellant involuntarily committed to mental
hospital after felony acquittal due to insanity plea).
35. Id. at 453.
36. Id. at 453. While Rouse followed several other courts in enforcing a statutory right
to treatment, it was one of the first cases to intimate that there might be a constitutionally
based right to treatment. Chief Judge Bazelon indicated the due process and equal protection clauses, as well as the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, might support
such an argument. See id. at 453.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (indefinite confinement without treatment is cruel and unusual punishment); Inmates
of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1366 (D.R.I. 1972) (confinement of
juveniles in dark, cold cells is cruel and unusual punishment); In re Wilson, 264 A.2d 614,
618 (Pa. 1970) (court set out factors necessary to justify making juveniles subject to longer
periods of confinement than adults charged with the same offense).
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ing "[i]ndefinite confinement without treatment of one who has been
found not criminally responsible may be so inhumane as to be 'cruel and
unusual.'

"38

Subsequently, an Illinois court" specifically held that failure to provide
proper treatment to a seventeen year old deaf-mute was a violation of
both the eighth and fourteenth amendments. " This rationale was followed by a Massachusetts court" which held that a program of treatment
must be provided within a reasonable time for an objection on eighth or
fourteenth amendment grounds to be overcome.2 Eventually the Alabama Federal District Court in Wyatt v. Stickney4" placed the right to
treatment squarely on constitutional grounds." The court stated that
confinement without treatment defeated the very purpose of confinement." "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic
theory that the confinement is for humane and therapeutic reasons and
then-fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of
due process."' 6
III.

CHANGES IN THE ADJUDICATIVE STAGE

Procedural changes resulting from recent United States Supreme Court

38. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally Birnbaum, The
Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 499-502 (1960). Such confinement has also been defined as that which is of such a repulsive nature as to "shock the conscience" of reasonable
and civil people. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 372-73 (E.D, Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). The court held that the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment precluded intolerable conditions as well as unjust individual
punishment. See id. at 372-73.
39. See In re Harris, 2 Crim. L. Rep. 2412 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook Co., Juv. Div. 1967). The
court ordered that Harris, a seventeen year old deaf mute, be transported to special classes
which would help him overcome his disability. The court based its holding on an Illinois
Juvenile statute, but went on to indicate that constitutional grounds did exist insuring Harris' right to proper treatment. See id. at 2412. See generally Kittrie, Can the Right to
Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?,57 GEO. L.J. 848, 875 n.22 (1969).
40. See In re Harris, 2 Crim. L. Rep. 2412, 2412 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook Co., Juv. Div. 1967).
41. See Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 233 N;E.2d 908, 909
(Mass. 1968). After denial of writ of mandamus, Nason sought habeas corpus relief contending that his confinement without treatment denied him equal protection of the laws and due
process. Id. at 909.
42. Id. at 914.
43. 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. See id. at 785.
45. See id. at 785.
46. Id. at 785. See generally Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 501
(1960); Reaves, The Right to Treatment for Juvenile Offenders, 7 CUM. L. REV. 13, 20-21
(1976).
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decisions apply to the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile proceeding.47 The
Supreme Court, in keeping with the original goals of the juvenile justice
system, has recognized that the juvenile court's purpose is to determine
the needs of the juvenile rather than adjudicating criminal conduct."'
While recognizing the juvenile must be afforded certain procedural safeguards, the Court in its opinion in In re Gault 49 declared that those safeguards could not interfere with the unique benefits of the juvenile system. 0 Subsequently, the Court in In re Winship,51 expanded the
reasoning of Gault by holding that juveniles were entitled to a criminal
standard of proof as this would not interfere with the juvenile's individualized right to treatment.2 In a later decision, however, the Court refused
to extend the right to a jury trial to juveniles fearing that such a right
would interfere with the juvenile process."8 These cases do not answer the
question of what to do with juvenile offenders once they are taken off the
street.5 4 Suggestions, plans, and standards are abundant, yet none will be
fully effective if implemented outside a right to treatment framework. 55

47. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (juveniles entitled to criminal
standard of proof); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (while juvenile system confers many
benefits on the juvenile, he must be given notice of pending charges, informed of the right to
counsel and the privilege against self incrimination, and be afforded the right of confrontation and cross-examination); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (needs of the
juvenile are paramount to adjudication of criminal conduct). But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (denying juvenile the right to jury trial).
48. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). The purpose of the juvenile
court is to determine the needs of the juvenile rather than to adjudicate criminal conduct.
Id. at 554-56.
49. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
50. See id. at 17.
51. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
52. See id. at 364.
53. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
54. While some lower courts are moving toward improvement of post-adjudicatory care
and treatment, others are not. Compare Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 125-26 (E.D.
Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977)
(establishing guidelines for post-adjudicatory care) with Pena v. New York State Div. for
Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 208-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (court may evaluate punitive and therapeutic aspects of institutions) and Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp.
1354, 1372-73 (D.R.I. 1972) (minimum conditions established by court). See generally
Volenik, Right to Treatment: Case Developments in Juvenile Law, 3 JUST. Sys. J. 292, 297306 (1978).
55. The recently published Standards for the Administration of Juvenile Justice are an
excellent example of such standards. They were prepared by the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The purpose of the standards is "to
respond to the enormous annual cost and unmeasurable loss of human life, personal security, and wasted human resources caused by juvenile delinquency.
NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STANDARDS
MINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

FOR THE AD-

1-13 (1980).
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COMMENT
RIGHT TO TREATMENT ARGUMENTS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO THE
JUVENILE SYSTEM

Examination of case law makes it clear that two basic arguments have
emerged in support of the right to treatment:" the parens patriae argument, which justifies intervention and commitment based upon the
state's police powers and its role as parens patriae;and the quid pro quo
argument, which states if procedural safeguards are removed treatment
must be the quid pro quo.57 These arguments have been adopted in juvenile cases." In 1967, two decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit
extended the rights recognized in Rouse to juveniles.5 9 Both decisions insisted that in appropriate cases there exists a legal right to custody that is
not inconsistent with the parens patriae promise in the law. 0 Subsequent cases further recognized the need for judicial intervention and the
constitutional footing on which treatment of institutionalized children is
based."1
Clearly, the courts are attempting to ensure treatment for institutional-

56. Most of the argument centers around whether or not the right should be given constitutional status. It is important to note that courts as well as commentators have trouble
finding a basis for the right to treatment in the absence of legislation. See Morales v.
Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 997-98 (5th Cir. 1977); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 70-72
(E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322
(1977). See generally Gough, The Beyond Control Child and the Right to Treatment: An
Exercise in the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST. L.U. L.J. 182, 188-89 (1971); Kittrie, Can the
Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process, 57 GEo. L.J. 848, 862-63
(1969).
57. Both arguments have received judicial recognition in one form or another. Most
courts are now more apt to rely on an eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment
argument than adopt the rationale of either the parens patriae or quid pro quo arguments.
See Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 997-98 (5th Cir. 1977). See generally Reaves, The
Right to Treatment for Juvenile Offenders, 7 CUM. L. REv. 13, 24 (1976); Volenik, Right to
Treatment: Case Developments in Juvenile Law, 3 JUST. Svs. J. 292, 292-95 (1978).
58. See In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125, 126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (petitioner sought review
because juvenile court judge failed to explore alternatives to confinement); Creek v. Stone,
379 F.2d 106, 108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (juvenile needing psychiatrist claimed confinement
without psychiatrist's services unlawful).
59. See In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106,
110 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
60. Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also Kittrie, Can the Right
to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57 GEo. L.J. 848, 873 (1969).
61. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974) (court followed rationale of Morales in recognizing constitutional right to treatment for juveniles); Morales v.
Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 125-26 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (recognizing constitutional right to treatment and ordering compliance with guidelines established), rev'd on other grounds, 535
F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977); Mortarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), enforcing 349 F. Supp. 575, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class action suit on behalf
of incarcerated juveniles; court found right to treatment on due process grounds).
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ized juveniles. The constraints by which our courts are bound, however,
preclude their affecting a comprehensive change without legislative support. 2 Lack of such support is painfully evidenced by a survey of existing
right to treatment legislation. Only ten states and the District of Columbia have recognized a statutory right to treatment"2 and of these, five
make only tacit reference to such a right."' Furthermore, no state has
adopted appropriate legislation necessary to implement such a right. In
fact, no state has even attempted to adopt standards by which a right to
treatment could be insured." For the right to treatment to be fully implemented, legislatures must provide more specific guidelines.
V.

TEXAS REACTION TO THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT FOR JUVENILES

The right to treatment concept has been received as reluctantly in
Texas as in the rest of the country.66 Courts are willing to enforce a right
to treatment; 67 however, the legislature has not yet recognized the right.6

62. Any movement by the courts requires legislative support because only the legislature can appropriate the funds needed for such a change. Additionally, legislatures are in a

much better position to establish the machinery which will put the right to treatment into
effect. See Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?,
57 GEO. L.J. 848, 879-80 (1969).
63. The applicable statutes guarantee the right to treatment for mental health patients,
but have not extended this right to juveniles. See IDAHO CODE § 66-344 (1980); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 34-2-13 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 91 (West 1979); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. arts. 5547-5570 (Vernon 1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-46 (Supp. 1979).
64. Four other states as well as the District of Columbia have given tacit recognition to
a right to treatment. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7251 (Deering 1979); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 21-562 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 100-7 (Smith-Hurd 1980-1981); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 225.15 (West 1980-1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-2 (1970).
65. See Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?,
57 GEO. L.J. 848, 863 n.52 (1969). Since the publication of Kittrie's article, New York has
repealed its right to treatment language. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 31.19-.21 (McKinney
1978).
66. The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas provided the Texas
Legislature with the impetus needed to formulate a legislative right to treatment. See
Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 125-26 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535
F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977). The legislative response was to repeal
existing legislation defining the goals and methods of the TYC and reincorporate such legislation into the Human Resources Code. The revised legislation was reduced from 78 sections
to 37 sections. While more concise, the revised goals and methods found in the Human
Resources Code suffer from lack of clarity. Compare 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 281, at 660
with TEX. HUMAN RES. CODE ANN. § 61.001-.077 (Vernon 1980).
67. See Note, Establishment of a Constitutional Right to Treatment for Delinquent
Children, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 366, 367-69 (1974).
68. The Human Resources Code does not address an express right to treatment for
juveniles. Compare TEX. HUMAN RES. CODE ANN. § 61.001-.077 (Vernon 1980) with IDAHO
CODE § 66-344 (1980).
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The court's willingness is exemplified by recent Texas cases reaffirming
the goals of the juvenile system as being rehabilitation and restoration to

useful citizenship." The cases recognizing a right to treatment in Texas,
do so on a limited statutory basis, being hesitant to recognize a constitutional right to treatment."0 This reluctance, however, has been removed
by a recent Fifth Circuit decision, Morales v. Turman."'

The Morales decision and its repercussions established the foundation
for Texas' current position regarding the right to treatment.7 In Morales,
a class action suit was brought against the executive director, members,

and employees of the Texas Youth Council (TYC) by a group of minor
children committed to TYC facilities." In a detailed opinion the court set
out numerous criteria the TYC would have to meet to afford proper treatment to incarcerated juveniles.7 ' Two facilities operated by the TYC were
ordered closed on grounds that confinement in such facilities constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. 7" The court further ordered that the par-

69. See In re S.J.C., 533 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. 1976) (McGee, J., dissenting). The court
must take great care to ensure that procedural requisites do not overshadow the protective
concept of parens patriae.Id. at 750 (McGee, J., dissenting). See also R.A.M. v. State, 599
S.W.2d 841, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ) (state parens patriae role
interested in the rehabilitation of juveniles); Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (juvenile system aimed at treatment and
rehabilitation).
70. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1977) (constitutional
right to treatment not expressly recognized but court willing to force TYC to provide treatment without express recognition); In re D.L.S., 520 S.W.2d 442, 444-45 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ) (upholding non-penal commitment to TYC while recognizing evidence juvenile not receiving treatment shows denial of equal protection); Smith v.
State, 444 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, no writ) (without evidence
that promise of treatment was not being kept, court could not strike down statute providing
for confinement of children).
71. 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir.
1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977).
72. The repercussions of Morales are best seen in the legislative changes which subsequently occurred. Subsections a, c, d, e, and f of article 5143 were repealed and reincorporated into the Human Resources Code. Compare 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 281, at 660 with
TEx. HUMAN REs. CODE ANN. § 61.001-.077 (Vernon 1980). Unfortunately the Human Resources Code is devoid of any reference to the right to treatment. See generally TEx. HUMAN
REs. CODE ANN. § 61.001-.077 (Vernon 1980).
73. Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 58 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977).
74. Id. at 61-126, rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S.
322 (1977). The opinion sets out requirements the TYC must meet to stay in operation.
These requirements deal with various rights including the right to consult with counsel and
the right to rehabilitative care and treatment, as well as the prohibition against unwarranted punishments. Id. at 61-126.
75. Three facilities at Gatesville were closed and the Mountain View facility was transferred to the Texas Department of Corrections. See Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 996
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ties submit a curative plan written by experts in fields dealing with
juveniles.76 Several appeals followed. 7 Eventually, on remand from the
Supreme Courts7 8 the Fifth Circuit ordered the district court to hear additional evidence regarding changes which had occurred within the TYC
since the action originally was filed.7 9 Noting that the Supreme Court recently had refused to recognize a constitutional right to treatment,s° the
district court held that any abuses found within the TYC could be enjoined on eighth amendment grounds without embracing the right to
treatment concept.8'
As a result of the Morales decisions, the enabling legislation for the
TYC was repealed in 1979.1 Although the Sixty-sixth Texas Legislature
re-enacted the TYC enabling legislation in the Human Resources Code, 8
the legislators made no substantive changes prior to re-enactment.s" In
some instances the language of the new statute is more vague than that of
the previous act.8s The applicable sections of the Human Resources Code
primarily address the administrative and procedural aspects of running
(5th Cir. 1977).
76. See Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 126 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977). The district court ordered
all parties to confer within 30 days for the purpose of drafting a detailed plan setting up a
network of facilities for the treatment of juveniles. The court specifically called for the
adoption of standards which would establish such a system. Id. at 126.
77. See Morales v. Turman, 535 F.2d 864, 865-67 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322
(1977). TYC appealed, contending that a three judge panel was necessary in order to affect
changes having a state-wide impact. Id. at 865. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed and remanded. Id. at 867. In 1976 the Supreme Court granted certiorari and held
that the district court judge properly exercised jurisdiction. See Morales v. Turman, 430
U.S. 322, 323 (1976).
78. See Morales v. Turman, 430 U.S. 322, 322-24 (1976).
79. See Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1977). The court found extensive changes had occurred within the TYC and that further hearings would be required
to determine the impact of such changes. Id. at 996-97.
80. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). In O'Connor,the Court held
that a non-dangerous person could not be confined without treatment. Id. at 576. Chief
Justice Burger's concurring opinion, however, expressly entitled the appellant to treatment,
yet gave no approval to the court of appeals' holding that a hospitalized individual has a
constitutional right to treatment This dicta was made applicable to juveniles as well as
mental health patients. Id. at 572 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
81. Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977).
82. 1937 Tex. Civ. Stat., tit. 82, art. 5143(a), (c), (d), (e) & (f), at 419-65.
83. See TEx. HUMAN REs. CoDi ANN. §§ 61.001-.077 (Vernon 1980). Included in the
code is the enabling legislation for the TYC. Id. §§ 61.011-.047.
84. The Code goes further to incorporate subchapters on admission and commitment
care and treatment, release, and miscellaneous provisions. See id. §§ 61.061-.077.
85. The provisions simplify and condense the old articles at the expense of creating a
broader and possibly more permissive piece of legislation. Compare id. §§ 61.001-.077 with
1949 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 538, at 988.
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the TYC. ss The Texas Legislature, however, provided for treatment and
care of the juvenile in chapter 61, subsection e of the Human Resources
87
Code.
While establishing some procedures for treatment, the vague and conditional language of the statute fails to address adequately the juvenile as
an individual." Three essential elements are missing from the current
statute. First, while the code states its purpose is to provide "a program
of constructive training aimed at rehabilitation and reestablishment in
society of children . . . committed to the Texas Youth Council . . .,"89
there is no express right to treatment which ensures this goal. s° Second,
the provisions dealing with care and treatment do not include specific
standards by which treatment is measured.' Finally, although the TYC
establishes and administers the standards which do exist, an autonomous
board composed of experts from the various fields dealing with juveniles
would be better equipped to handle evaluation of the program's standards, while the TYC handled the administrative function. 9' Consequently, the applicable sections of the Human Resources Code must be
expanded or supplemented to ensure the right to treatment. Through
comprehensive right to treatment legislation, the courts and administrative agencies will be better able to fulfill the purpose stated in the
Code-"[c]onstructive training aimed at rehabilitation. .. .

86. TEx.

HUMAN REs. CODE ANN.

§§ 61.001-.047 (Vernon 1980).

87. See id. §§ 61.071-.076.
88. Id. §§ 61.071-.076. This subsection deals with seven major elements: examinations,
re-examinations, records, failure to examine, determination of treatment, type of treatment
permitted, and the mentally ill child. The permissive language which runs rampant through
these sections does not approach setting standards to determine whether or not the juvenile
is receiving adequate treatment. According to the statute, the council "may" do just about
anything which does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. In fact, under the code,
the council need do nothing with the juvenile in the way of treatment or rehabilitation. Id.
§9 61.071-.077.
89. Id. § 61.002.
90. Section e of chapter 61 deals with the care and treatment afforded juveniles committed to TYC facilities. See id. §§ 61.071-.077. This section sets out only a few standards
which must be met, all of which use permissive language, but none of which includes an
express right to treatment. See id. §§ 61.071-.077.
91. Id. §§ 61.071-.077.
92. The TYC is composed of individuals in the community who are known for their
interest in juveniles. There is no guarantee that the members of the group are employed in
youth service occupations. See id. § 61.012. A group of experienced experts would be better
equipped to set minimum standards than someone whose great interest in juveniles is outweighed only by their lack of expertise in the field. See Halpern, A PracticingLawyer Views
the Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 782, 808 (1969).

93. TEx.

HUMAN

REs.

CODE ANN.

§ 61.002 (Vernon 1980).
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PROPOSED RIGHT TO TREATMENT

An overview of the legislation hereinafter proposed will aid in its interpretation. The purpose of such legislation is to establish an express right
to treatment for institutionalized juveniles and set standards which must
be met to ensure this right." This purpose can be accomplished through
the creation of an autonomous Standards Committee to formulate minimum standards and assist the TYC in application and interpretation."
The committee should be composed of members of the educational, medical, social science, legal, and administrative fields, who specialize in dealing with juveniles and their particular needs." The TYC would actually
remain in control of the administrative function, while the committee
would establish minimum standards the TYC must meet.
The standards established by the committee should recognize that institutionalized juveniles have an enforceable right to receive adequate
treatment based upon their particular needs.9 7 The committee must define adequate treatment, keeping in mind that individuals' needs will
vary. 8 Furthermore, the standards must ensure the treatment of the juvenile is adequate. To this end, the committee must establish procedures
by which the juvenile, as well as the courts, may enforce the right to
treatment." Finally, the committee must promulgate a review procedure
which, not only relieves the juvenile of the burden of confronting employ-

94. The Human Resources Code contains a limited number of "standards" which must
be followed. They include keeping records, making examinations, and providing for the
treatment of mentally ill children. Id. §§ 61.071-.077. A more comprehensive set of standards backing up an express right to treatment not only insures the right of the juvenile but
also gives administrative authorities a solid framework within which to design a rehabilitative program for juveniles. See generally American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on the Question of Adequacy of Treatment, 123 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1458, 1460 (1967);
Halpern, A PracticingLawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 782, 811-17
(1969); Szasz, The Right to Health, 57 GEo. L.J. 784, 786-87 (1969).
95. See generally Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile
Process?, 57 GEO. L.J. 848, 862-65 (1969); Lemert, Legislating Change in the Juvenile
Court, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 421, 447-48 (1967); Reaves, The Right to Treatment for Juvenile
Offenders, 7 CuM. L. REV. 13, 25-26 (1976).
96. See Halpern, A PracticingLawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 782,
810 (1969). Halpern sets out six criteria which must be included in right to treatment legislation. An autonomous board of experts is one of those criteria. Id. at 811.
97. The Standards Committee is the most essential part of the proposed legislation.
This core of experts directly establishes the standards by which each facility must be run
thereby allowing the TYC to fulfill its administrative function as set out in the Human
Resources Code. See Tax. HUMAN RS. CODE ANN. §§ 61.011-.047 (Vernon 1980). See also
Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57 GEO. L.J.
848, 862 (1969).
98. See Appendix, §§ 7-8.
99. See id. § 4(b)(1).
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ees of state detention facilities with objections to substandard treatment,
but also defines what judicial remedies are available to juveniles who establish the fact they were not provided adequate treatment.10 0 Establishment of this committee would lift the tremendous burden currently
shouldered by the TYC, of formulating and applying standards as well as
administering facilities,"01 thereby facilitating a more efficient system. Additionally, formulation of such standards would be left to experts, rather
than political appointees.
The proposed legislation also requires an independant Review Board
whose main functions are to assist the TYC in the initial assessment of
the juvenile and periodically review the juvenile's progress toward rehabilitation.102 Requiring a periodic review ensures ongoing evaluation of
goals and objectives for treatment. The Review Board, therefore, not the
courts, will assume the position of program watchdog.10 3 This procedure
relieves the courts of administrative functions and makes the TYC answerable to an independant body of experts. Overall this section of the
proposed legislation ensures adequate care and treatment as well as an
efficient system.
Finally, the proposed legislation outlines possible avenues of relief
available to juveniles who have not been receiving adequate treatment.'"
When the juvenile or his guardian believes that minimum standards have
not been met, they must first petition the Juvenile Treatment Review
Board for a determination of whether the juvenile is receiving adequate
treatment.1 05 Upon receiving a complaint the Reveiw Board will investi-

100. See id. §§ 6-8.
101. See TEx. HUMAN REs. CODE ANN. §§ 61.032, .034, .044 (Vernon 1980). See generally Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57 GEo.
L.J. 848, 879 (1969).
102. The establishment of the Review Board rounds out a system of checks and balances designed to insure the juvenile's right to treatment. The Standards Committee sets
out the minimum standards which the administrative body, the TYC, must work within.
The Review Board insures that these standards are being met by the TYC. See Halpern, A
PracticingLawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 782, 842 (1969). See generally Lemert, Legislating Change in the Juvenile Court, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 421, 462 (1967).
103. Judicial relief is recognized as a last resort in the proposed legislation. This legislation is designed to take much of the work away from the court. After the child is adjudicated delinquent he is placed in the juvenile system for a determination of what specific
mode of treatment should be employed. The court's primary function is to insure that the
juvenile's constitutional rights are protected. Judicial review of treatment programs should
only occur when there is an irreconcilable difference of opinion as to whether the juvenile is
receiving adequate treatment. See generally Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 97, 194 (1961).
104. See Appendix, §§ 6-8.
105. See id. § 7(a)(1).
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gate to determine what, if any, corrective action must be taken.'" Once
the Review Board has made a determination, the petitioner may petition
the court for any of the following reasons: if the petitioner disagrees with
the board's findings; if the findings indicate non-compliance with minimum standards; or if the petitioner believes the minimum standards still
are not being met.' 7 The court shall have the power to order such remedies as it deems necessary, including, in limited circumstances, release of
the petitioner.' 0 '
VII.

CONCLUSION

During the past twenty-five years courts have indicated a willingness to
support the right to treatment concept. 0 9 Courts, however, are limited in
their power to affect a change.'"0 Legislatures are in a much better position to define procedures and remedies." ' The Texas Legislature has an
excellent start toward this goal, but it should not be satisfied with the
present rules."2 Further legislation specifically adopting the right to
treatment and provisions such as those herein proposed would enhance
greatly a court's ability to review and implement the right to treatment
for juveniles.11' The Texas Legislature, however, must also provide the
physical and financial resources necessary to make right to treatment legislation meaningful. Indeed, most commentators agree that the lack of
resources allocated to juvenile institutions and treatment programs precludes their effectiveness.''
106. See id. § 7.
107. See id. § 8. As previously mentioned, judicial relief is recognized as a last resort to
the proposed legislation which should only be used when irreconcilable conflicts arise. See
generally Gough, The Beyond Control Child and the Right to Treatment: An Exercise in
the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST. L.U. L.J. 182, 198-200 (1971).
108. See Appendix, § 8.
109. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977) (right to treatment not
expressly recognized yet court willing to force TYC to provide treatment); In re D.L.S., 520
S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ) (evidence juvenile not receiving
treatment demonstrates denial of equal protection); Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, no writ) (without evidence that promise of treatment was not
being kept, court could not strike down statute providing for confinement of children).
110. See Volenik, Right to Treatment: Case Developments in Juvenile Law, 17 JUST.
Sys. J. 292, 305 (1978).
111. See Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile System?,
57 GEO. L.J. 848, 879 (1969); Lemert, Legislating Change in the Juvenile Court, 1967 Wis.
L. REv. 421, 429-32 (1967).
112. See TEx. HuMAN REs. CODE ANN. §§ 61.001-.077 (Vernon 1980).
113. For a full summary of positions recommended by Standards Groups, see NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE DISPOSITIONS AND
CORRECTIONS, STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 10, 57-58 (1977).

114. See generally Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juve-
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Results of studies of adult prison populations establish that large percentages of such populations were juvenile offenders." 6 Taking these
studies into account, a logical argument can be made in favor of providing
resources to rehabilitate juveniles. If treatment is not provided at an early
age, resources nevertheless must be provided to support adult prison
populations. 1 '6 Finally, as Chief Judge Bazelon so wisely stated, "when
the legislature justifies confinement by a promise of treatment, it thereby
commits the community to provide the resources necessary to fulfill the
promise . . .and the duty that society assumes, to fulfill the promise of
treatment employed to justify involuntary confinement is clear."9117

nile Process?, 57 GEo. L.J. 848, 858-60 (1969); Lemert, Legislating Change in the Juvenile
Court, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 421.
115. See S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, OF DELINQUENCY AND CRIME 167-76 (1974).
116. See id. at 241-49.
117. See Bazelon, The Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 673, 676 (1969).
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APPENDIX
THE TEXAS RIGHT TO TREATMENT ACT 1'"
Proposed Legislation for Juveniles
§1

Philosophy
This act establishes a uniform procedure whereby incarcerated
juveniles are guaranteed proper and adequate treatment; minimum
standards of care for such treatment; and redress for failure to provide adequate treatment.
§2 Juveniles Right to Minimum Standards of Treatment11'
A) Every juvenile confined in a state institution must be accorded the
minimum treatment provided for in this act. The Review Board,
hereinafter designated, shall inform each juvenile of his/her rights
under this act taking into consideration the age and cognizant ability
of the juvenile.
B) A summary of the "Minimum Standards" and a statement of the
right to treatment as set out in this act shall be made available to the
parents or legal guardian of the juvenile, and shall be written in plain
and concise language.
§3 Definitions (as used in this act)
A) "Committee" is the Juvenile Treatment Standards Committee.
B) "Board" is the Juvenile Treatment Review Board.
C) "Manual" is the Manual of Minimum Standards for the treatment
of juveniles in state detention facilities.
D) "Minimum Standards" refers to those standards prepared and
adopted by the Committee and contained in the manual.
E) "Treatment" means a program of individualized therapy aimed at
the rehabilitation of the juvenile which conforms to the standards established by the Committee.
F) "Director" refers to the Executive Director of the Texas Youth
Council.
§4 Establishment of the Juvenile Treatment Standards Committee8 0
118. The Texas Right To Treatment Act is based on legislation which was introduced
in the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1967. See S.B. 1274 and H.B. 2118. Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1968 Sess., reprinted in Halpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 Gao. L.J. 782, 811 app. (1969). The bill was reintroduced unsuccessfully in 1969 as
S.B. 158.
119. See generally Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57 Gao. L.J. 848, 849-51 (1969); Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945, 947-49 (1959). See also Morales v.
Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 121-26 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864
(5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977).
120. The Committee is the basis of the proposed legislation. It forms the standards by
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A) Within 90 days after the effective date of this act the Juvenile
Treatment Standards Committee shall be formed.
B) The Committee shall consist of the following members:
(1) a licensed administrative psychologist with at least five years administrative experience in a juvenile treatment facility;
(2) a licensed psychiatrist who is a member of the American Psychiatric
Association and has experience with juveniles;
(3) a licensed pediatric physician who is a member of the American Medical Association;
(4) a psychiatric social worker, holding at least a master's degree and having five years experience in institutional psychiatric social work with juvenile populations;
(5) a clinical psychologist who is a member of the Clinical Psychologists of
the American Psychological Association and who has had experience with
juveniles;
(6) an educator licensed by the State of Texas who has had at least five
years teaching experience at the elementary or secondary levels;
(7) the executive director of the Texas Youth Council; 2 and
(8) an attorney with five years experience in juvenile law.
No committee member shall be appointed who has been employed by
the State of Texas, its subdivisions or agencies during the three year
period immediately proceeding their appointment.
§5 Preparationand Adoption of Minimum Standards
A) The Treatment Standards Committee shall prepare a Manual of
Minimum Standards for the Treatment of Juveniles which shall set
out the standards of treatment acceptable to the professional association which each Committee member represents. The Committee shall
have six months to complete the Manual.
B) The Standards are not limited to but must include:
(1) the number of professional and non-professional personnel per juvenile population who are directly responsible for the care and treatment
of the juvenile and the maximum number of juveniles assigned to each
psychiatrist, physician, social worker, attorney, aide, instructor, or
attendant;
(2) the minimum amount of treatment each child shall receive from appropriate professional personnel, determined in terms of frequency and
which the other units must operate. Requiring that the Committee be composed of experts
in dealing with juveniles helps insure progressive rehabilitation of the juvenile. See Halpern,
A PracticingLawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 782, 808-09 (1969).
121. See Tax. HUMAN REs. ConE ANN. § 61.017 (Vernon 1980).
122. See generally Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 85-126 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977); Halpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 782, 810-11 (1969).
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duration of contact, recognizing that prescribed professional treatment
may vary between the three different stages of incarceration (the admission and diagnostic phase, the treatment phase, and the post release
phase);
(3) the frequency and extent of general physical examinations;
(4) that minimum employment prerequisites for institutional staff shall
comply with the minimum standards established by the State of Texas for
licensing in their respective fields;
(5) that treatment method and procedure are to be designed by the diagnostic staff of the appropriate institution to suit the individual juvenile.
C) Each juvenile treatment facility involved shall receive a copy of

the minimum standards. Each juvenile treatment facility shall be responsible for keeping a complete and accurate record of treatment for
each juvenile confined therein, clearly showing compliance with the
minimum standards. These records shall be made available to any independently retained psychiatrists, physicians, attorneys, or other
authorized professionals, and to the Review Board hereinafter
designated.
D) The Committee shall review the minimum treatment standards
every two years and make appropriate changes. Copies of any amendments to the minimum standards must be distributed to appropriate
institutions and interested persons.
3
§6 The Juvenile Treatment Review Board2
The Committee shall:
A) appoint a Treatment Review Board for each treatment facility,
composed of one licensed child psychologist, one pediatric physician,
one social worker, and one attorney; and
B) provide that the function of the Review Board be two fold:
(1) When a juvenile is admitted and diagnosed, the Board shall review
each juvenile's record to ensure that the planned course of treatment complies with minimum standards. Furthermore, within 90 days of the admission/diagnostic review, the Board shall review the juvenile's record to ensure ongoing compliance with minimum standards. Thereafter, the Board
shall review each juvenile's progress on a case by case basis every 120 days.
(2) The Board shall receive, hear, and investigate all complaints filed by
or on behalf of the juvenile alleging non-compliance with minimum standards. The Board shall issue findings on each petition submitted.
§7

Legal Remedies
A) When an institutionalized juvenile, his or her parent, legal guardian, designated relative, or other interested person, believes that the

123. See S.B. 1274 and H.B. 2118, Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1968 Sess., reprintedin Halpern,
A PracticingLawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 782, 811 app. (1969).
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minimum standards, as set out in the Manual, are not being adhered
to, the individual shall have the right to take action by petitioning
the Board for a formal determination of whether or not the minimum
standards have been met. The petition must be in writing and include
all reasons which lead the petitioner to believe adequate treatment
had not been rendered.
B) The Board shall hold hearings, make appropriate investigations,
and confer with the director of the facility where the juvenile is
confined.
(1) Each petition shall be reviewed en banc;
(2) the Board shall publish written findings within 30 days after receipt of
the petition and shall determine whether or not minimum standards have
been met, and whether or not the director agrees to provide acceptable
treatment;
(3) the findings must delineate in what way the treatment has failed to
meet the minimum standards; and
(4) copies of the findings shall be given to the petitioner and the director
of the facility wherein the juvenile resides.
C) Any remedial action must be implemented within 90 days after
publication of the Board findings.
(1) At the conclusion of the 90 day period, the Board shall inquire as to
whether the juvenile has received the modified treatment.
(2) If the Board receives no response, then it shall make further appropriate investigations and issue a final finding.
D) A record of all proceedings under this section shall become a part
of the juvenile's permanent record.
may be filed no more frequently than
E) A petition under this section
4
1
once in a six month period.

§8 Right to Petition Court'25
A) The juvenile, through his or her parent, legal guardian, designated
relative, or other interested person may petition a court regarding violations of the minimum standards if:
(1) the petitioner disagrees with a board finding that the minimum standards have been met;

(2) the Board's final determination indicated non-compliance with the
mininum standards and the petitioner believes that minimum standards
are still not being met; and
(3) the Board fails to notify the petitioner of its determination within 30
days after reciept of the petition.

124. See id. § 7.
125. See id. § 8.
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B) The following legal remedies are available to the petitioner:
(1) Petition for writ of mandamus;
(2) Petition for mandatory injunction; and
(3) Petitions for writ of habeas corpus in accordance with Texas law.' 26 In
the case of such petitions the court may make orders as it deems appropriate regarding disposition of charges pending against the juvenile. Further,
the court may order a probationary period during which the juvenile is
required to continue treatment on an individual basis, provided payment

for such treatment is made by the state.

C) The defendants named in such a suit shall be the Director of
the appropriate institution and the Secretary of the Standards
Committee.
D) Any petitioner taking aforementioned court action shall have the
right to have all evidence presented de novo before the court and
shall have the right to appeal any adverse ruling of the court.
E) The petitioner, even though indigent, may obtain independant
professional evaluations for the purpose of supporting the allegations
in his or her petition. Such evaluators shall be allowed to present evidence and testimony to the Board and the court in any proceeding
hereunder.
F) Each petitioner shall have the right to adequate legal counsel in
proceedings under this section. Indigency shall not interfere with this
right.
G) When the court determines that the minimum standards of treatment have not been and will not be met, the juvenile shall be released
and placed on a mandatory independant treatment program. In such
a case, the state will bear the burden of the program's expense.
H) The Board and the Director, with the consent of the petitioner,
may design a private program of treatment independant of court action and paid for by the state. In cases where independant treatment
programs are used, the Board and the Director shall review the juvenile's progress at least every twelve months and determine the need
for continued treatment.

126. See Tsx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 11.01-.64 (Vernon Supp. 1981).
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